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firms 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates from the UK context, the impact of board and CEO characteristics on 
CEO compensation in Travel and Leisure firms. Namely we employ, board size, board 
independence and board meetings to reflect board characteristics. We also include two CEO 
features, CEO tenure and CEO age into our models. Using panel data analysis, the findings in 
this paper indicate that board size, board independence and CEO age are important factors 
affecting CEO pay.  In addition, we report a positive non-linear relationship between CEO 
tenure and firm performance. Hence, using Travel and Leisure listed firms; we provide new 
evidence of the relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation. 
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Introduction 
Rewarding CEOs with bonus, salary and other benefits has been always a debate in the 
literature. From agency theory perspectives, even CEOs need to be motivated to meet firms’ 
objectives by rewarding them. Previous studies, in CEO compensation, have mainly been 
focused on publicly listed firms (see Antle and Smith 1986; Ciscel and Carroll 1980; Jensen 
and Murphy 1990). However, we find limited evidence for this relationship within the 
tourism related firms (see for example, Skalpe, 2007). Our study hence aims to bridge this 
gap in the literature and to provide a more focused discussion using UK listed Travel and 
Leisure firms. 
In this study we measure the importance of the CEO by CEO pay slice (CEO pay), which 
is the percentage of CEO compensation to the total cash compensation of top executives 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011). High CEO compensation can indicate that CEOs have superior 
qualifications or even capabilities. This will enhance CEOs contribution towards the firm. 
However, high “CEO pay” can be explained by the managerial power view point, and hence 
weak governance will lead to weak compensation contracts, and thus powerful CEOs can 
take such advantage for their own benefits. 
The relationship between corporate governance factors and top management pay has gain 
much interest by researchers due to the growing concerns by the authorities regarding firms’ 
internal monitoring activities (see, Cadbury report 1992; Smith report 2002). For example, 
Ozkan (2007) argues that corporate governance characteristics help in alleviating agency 
problems between management and shareholders and in turn have an impact on the CEO pay. 
Unlike previous studies, we provide a new evidence of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and top management pay in tourism related firms. This is an 
interesting setting given the differences in the governance structure for such context if 
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compared to other firms1. There is a general consensus that firms within the hospitality sector 
are more prone to agency related problems due to governance and ownership issues (Guillet 
et al., 2012).  In addition, the real estate component of such industry would increase the 
capital intensity within the tourism related firms will lead to extra agency conflicts.  
In the UK, the recommendations of Cadbury report (1992), Greenbury report (1995) and 
Hampel report (1998) were the base to formulate a part of London Stock Exchange 
Combined code (FRC, Combined Code, 2008). Therefore, if compared to US firms, CEOs of 
UK firms have relatively weaker influence over the remuneration committee when 
negotiating their compensation packages. Thus, UK firms, including tourism related 
companies, are more likely to compensate their CEOs based on their capabilities to enhance 
firm performance. It is worth noting that Ozkan (2011) has indicated that such reports, which 
linked CEO compensation with firm performance, are indeed not effective and thus 
reinvestigating the top management pay within the UK context and, in particular the tourism 
related firms would add significantly to the CEO compensation literature.  
There is limited evidence of investigating the top pay for tourism related firms within the 
UK context and hence the main aim of this study is to complement the existing research in 
the CEO compensation area by investigating the role of governance mechanisms on the CEO 
pay within the UK tourism related firms.  Tourism as a sector is important in the UK, since it 
is one of the six biggest industries and sectors (Government Tourism Policy, 2011).  
 
                                                          
1  For example, we compare our sample of Travel and Leisure listed firms with other non-financial firms listed 
in FTSE 350, we find that on average board size is relatively smaller in our sample (around 9) compared to 
around 10 for the non-financial counterparts (for the same period).  CEO tenure is on average around 4.6 years 
in our sample while it is 5.70 years in other non-financial firms.  CEO compensation for our sample is relatively 
smaller than their non-financial counterparts (0.39 vs 0.42).  
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Skalpe (2007) reports that the gender wage gap is higher in tourism related firms if 
compared to their manufacturing counterparts, since the female CEOs in tourism related 
firms are employed in small firms (compared to manufacturing firms). Al-Najjar (2014, 
2015) also denotes that tourism related firms might have some differences in their corporate 
governance and ownership structure. This study, thus, expands the work of Skalpe (2007), in 
CEO compensation with tourism related firms, and shed a new light on the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and CEO pay using UK Travel and Leisure 
listed firms. 
Accordingly, our contribution has two folds. First, we examine how corporate 
governance variables such as board size, board independence and board meetings will affect 
CEO pay. Secondly, we examine the role of CEO characteristics, such as CEO tenure and 
CEO experience on CEO compensation within the listed tourism firms’ context.  
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework; 
Section 3 provides the discussion of the hypotheses; Section 4 describes the data and 
methodology; Section 5 presents the empirical findings and Section 6 concludes. 
Theoretical Framework  
Our main theoretical framework in this study is based on two stands: rent extraction theory 
and incentive alignment theory (see, Chalmers et al. 2006). The rent extraction theory states 
that any increase in equity holdings would be in line with the expected good news and would 
be used by top managers (with private information) for their own interests.  Yermack (1997), 
Carpenter and Remmers (2001) and Bebchuck al. (2002) provide support for this theory. This 
theory, hence, questions the efficiency of the boards as they depend on CEOs for information 
and their limited access for stock returns. This leads CEOs to over control their compensation 
even if it exceeds the optimal shareholders compensation. In addition, less active governance 
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monitoring will lead to more agency conflicts that might affect firm’s prospectus (Chalmers 
et al., 2006). Bebchuck et al. (2002) argue that because top managers can control their 
compensation, they can affect the amount and timing of equity arranged by the board to 
maximize their own wealth regardless to shareholders’ wealth. If a firm is to be sold, the rent 
extraction theory argues that any grants provided to top management before the sale are 
intended to enrich the top managers. Narayanan and Seyhun (2005) and Lie (2005) argue that 
top management would use private information and influence their compensation to 
maximise the equity awards. Core et al. (1999) argue that strong CEOs are more able to 
extract rents from the compensation process. Hence, rent extraction arises in weakly 
governed companies. 
In contrast, the incentive alignment theory suggests that any increase in equity holdings 
would lead top managers to take actions to enhance shareholders’ wealth.  This theory states 
that governance factors affect the efficiency of monitoring management and executives and 
hence linking management decisions to firm benefits. This theory, hence, suggests that the 
reward structure is formed to provide incentives to managers to take decisions within the 
interests of shareholders and thus reducing agency conflicts. Different studies have supported 
the incentive alignment theory such as Fich and Shivdasani (2005), Hanlon et al. (2003) and 
Hall and Murphy (2002).  Chalmers et al. (2006) using a sample of Australian firms find a 
support for the incentive alignment theory viewpoint and report a weak evidence of the rent 
extraction theory. It is also argued that if a firm is to be sold, then the “incentive alignment” 
would mean that any agreed options to the top management before finalising the deal will 
aim to at enhance firm value since the CEOs will aim to get the best possible price.  
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Hypotheses Development 
We discuss in this section the hypotheses of our main variables: 
Board Size and Independence: Board size is one of the key corporate governance aspects. 
The board is comprised of executive and independent directors. Board size can be seen as an 
efficient tool for monitoring firm’s management (see Fama and Jensen 1983). However, it is 
suggested that large boards are inefficient because of the expected difficulties in the 
collaboration among the board members. Conyon and Peck (1998) argue that there is a 
positive relationship between board size and CEO compensation. Core et al. (1999) argue that 
firms with large boards are inefficient in monitoring. Hence, small boards might have more 
control and thus low CEO pay. Given the contradictory evidence on the role of board size in 
listed tourism related firms, as reported by Al-Najjar (2014); we posit that board size has an 
impact on CEO pay in our context. 
In addition, board independence is a major mechanism which helps in alleviating agency 
problems. Having a high percentage of independent directors on boards is regarded as an 
indicator for proper corporate governance. This is because they are in a position to effectively 
control and monitor management (Hermalin and Weisbach,1998). Core et al. (1999) suggest 
that weak corporate governance (such as less board independence) is positively related to 
CEO compensation. As sustained by Fama and Jensen (1983), independent directors have the 
ability to strictly monitor top management. Conyon and Peck (1998) argue that if high 
salaries are linked to agency problems then, higher level of board independence will 
eventually reduce compensation. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that independent 
boards do not effectively influence CEO compensation (see Mangel and Singh, 1993). From 
tourism listed firms view point, Al-Najjar (2014) detects that board independence is 
positively related to firm performance and hence can be seen as an effective governance tool 
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in such context. Therefore, we posit a negative relationship between board independence and 
CEO compensation. This is consistent with the incentive alignment theory perspective, and 
hence we posit that:  
H1: There is a relationship between board size and CEO compensation.     
H2: There is a negative relationship between board independence and CEO compensation. 
Board meetings: 
Vafeas (1999) examines the relationship between the frequency of board meetings, board 
activity and firm financial performance. His results show that boards can react to poor 
performance by having more board meetings. He reports that more frequent board meetings 
can enhance firm performance. Hence, we can conclude that the frequency of board meetings 
is seen as an important feature in firms’ governance and might affect the compensation 
packages, as such packages are linked to firm performance. Brick et al. (2006) report a 
positive association between board meetings and compensation of directors, given that 
directors are paid for each meeting. Board meetings as a governance tool is under-researched 
in listed tourism firms, we expect it might have an impact on CEO pay as a governance 
mechanism. Hence, we expect that: 
H3: There is a relationship between board meetings and CEO compensation. 
CEO Characteristics: We investigate two CEO features on CEO pay. First we consider CEO 
tenure which is measured as the CEO experience. Several empirical studies have analyzed 
CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO compensation (see Leonard, 1990; Cordeiro and 
Veliyath, 2003). Hill and Phan (1991) show that the longer a CEO holds his/her position, the 
more experience he/she has, and thus constructing an experienced career which entails the 
CEO to be highly compensated. The second investigated CEO feature is CEO age. It is 
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expected that older CEOs, with adequate years of experience and expertise, are more likely to 
be rewarded for their work. Thus, a positive link is expected for CEO age. Madura et al. 
(1996) suggest that old aged CEOs and those with more experience (tenure) are highly 
compensated. In tourism related firms, there is some evidence of the relationship between 
CEO characteristics and CEO payment, for example Skalpe (2007) detects a positive 
association between CEO age and CEO gender pay gap.  Hence, in line with rent extraction 
theory, we posit that CEO tenure and CEO age are positively related to CEO pay.   
H4: There is a positive relationship between CEO tenure and CEO compensation 
H5: There is a positive relationship between CEO age and CEO compensation  
Data & Sample 
Our sample is based on Travel and Leisure listed firms in FTSE 350.  FTSE 350 index 
includes the largest 350 companies by market capitalisation having their primary listing at the 
London Stock Exchange. This index is formed by the combination of the FTSE 100 
index (the largest 100 companies) and the FTSE 250 Index (the next largest 250 firms). Thus, 
FTSE 350 index refers to the largest firms listed at the London Stock Exchange. 
 From this index, we have a sample of 260 firm year observations from 27 Travel and Leisure 
listed firms (un-balanced panel data) that provided the required information for the period 
from 2003 to 2012. This period provides us with the most complete set of data (especially for 
the governance related data for our sample). 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (CEO compensation) 
and our independent variables (corporate governance, CEO features and firm specific 
variables). The mean of CEO compensation ratio-CEO pay slice- is around 0.39 and hence 
the CEO pay slice, compared to top directors’ compensation, is around 39% of the top paid 
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directors. The average board size is 9 with a maximum of 17 directors in our sample. 
Moreover, board independence is about 64% of the sample. Concerning the CEO 
characteristics, it is found that on average a CEO is 52 years of age in the sample. 
Furthermore, on average a CEO has about 5 years of experience. 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the independent variables used in the 
analysis. It can be observed form the Table that there are no high correlations among the 
variables and hence multicolinearity is not of a concern in our models.  
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
Methodology 
In order to investigate our hypotheses, we estimate the fixed effects models2 as well as the 
cross sectional –time series models using two ways clustering (firms and years), as a robust 
check, for our panel data of 260 firm year observations. Our model to be examined is defined 
below: 
 
 
 
Where CEOcomp is the dependent variable, CEO pay slice, which is the percentage of the 
total cash compensation of the CEO to the top executives compensation; Board_size is the 
number of board directors; board_independence is the ratio of number of independent 
directors to total number of directors on the board; Board meetings frequency is measured by 
                                                          
2 The Lagrange Multiplier indicates that the random effects models are more appropriate than the pooled models 
in our analysis. In addition, the Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects models are more appropriate than 
the random effects models. Hence, we report in this study the fixed effects models. 
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the number meetings in a year; CEO_Age is the age of the CEO and CEO_Tenure is the 
number of years the CEO is serving in his/her position. We control for leverage (total debt to 
equity ratio), size (natural logarithm of total assets) and ROE (measured by net income 
divided to total equity). To capture the trend and other un-included elements we include year 
dummies in our models, and for parsimony we do not report them in our tables.  
Results 
The fixed effects models regressions are reported Table 3, while the two way clustered errors 
are reported in Table 4. Four models are presented and year dummies are included wherever 
is mentioned in the Tables. Models 1 and 2 exclude the control variables while Models 3 and 
4 include them. 
It can be observed that board size has a significant negative sign in all the models. This 
indicates that firms with large boards are more hesitant to pay a high compensation to their 
CEOs.  This result is in line with our first hypothesis and represents the importance of large 
boards (in our setting) in determining the CEO pay. This result can be seen as evidence that 
CEOs will not be able to control large boards, leading to lower CEO compensation. We also 
report a significant positive sign in all the models for board independence and thus indicating 
that independent directors are seen as a week monitoring tool. This result contradicts our 
second hypothesis. It may be possible, to argue, as sustained by Zajac and Westpal (1994) 
that board independence might be ineffective as they have low percentage of shares owned. 
Hence, this leads to a decrease in the required control and monitoring and thus rewarding 
CEOs are more prevalent, as there is less control of top management. This positive 
association is consistent with the findings of Ozkan (2007) who also reports that the higher 
the percentage of independent directors in a firm, the less effective they are in monitoring 
management operations. This result is in line with the rent extraction theory viewpoint.  
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 The results in Tables 3 and 4 do not show significant evidence for board meetings on CEO 
compensation. As regards CEO characteristics (CEO age and CEO tenure), our results in 
Table 4 indicate that there is positive effect of CEO age on CEO compensation in Models 1, 2 
and 4.  Thus, older CEOs are better remunerated than younger CEOs (Smith and Watts, 
1982), which is consistent with H5.  We also report that there is a positive association 
between firm size and profitability in firm performance, these results are reported in Panel A, 
Table 3.  
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
Accordingly, we provide further evidence -using Travel and Leisure firms- regarding the 
association between corporate governance and CEO compensation, in which we find that 
board size, board independence and CEO age affect CEO compensation.  
It is worth noting that the Hausman test of endogeneity shows that there is no endogeneity 
problem in our models and hence our models are more appropriate than the 2SLS models. We 
also run several models, such as the first lagged models, to double check the robustness of 
our results, the results are not significantly different than what is reported in this study.  
As additional robustness check we add to our models the square values of CEO tenure and 
CEO age and report the results in Table 5. The results are consistent with the previous 
findings as we detect a negative relationship between CEO pay and board size while a 
positive relationship is found between CEO pay and board independence. We also report a 
positive association between firm size and profitability. As regards CEO tenure, the results 
are positive and significant, which is consistent with our hypothesis, the results of the squared 
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value of CEO tenure is found to be negative and significant, indicating a non-linear positive 
relationship between the period served the CEO and his/her compensation.  
<<Insert Table 5 about here>> 
Summary and overall conclusion 
This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance features and 
CEO compensation using UK Travel and Leisure listed firms. The study employs panel data 
analysis for our models and provides evidence that corporate governance have an impact on 
CEO pay. In particular, we find that board size is negatively related to CEO pay and board 
independence is positively associated to CEO pay (in line with the rent extraction theory). In 
addition, regarding the CEO characteristics, we detect that CEO age is positively associated 
with CEO compensation and thus older CEOs are paid more than younger CEOs. Finally, we 
detect a non- linear positive relationship between CEO tenure and CEO pay. These results 
reflect the unique setting of tourism related firms in the UK. Accordingly, we provide further 
evidence, using tourism related firms, about the effect of corporate governance on CEO 
compensation policy. 
These findings are important for UK policy makers and the management of UK listed firms 
as we find that large board size is associated with lower CEO compensation. Also, we detect 
a weak impact of board independence as a monitoring tool. Thus, the role of independent 
directors in UK listed firms need to be identified and clarified in a clear way. In addition, we 
detect that CEO age can reflect experienced CEOs and hence they are paid higher than young 
CEOs. Finally, we report that there is a positive but non-linear link between CEO tenure and 
CEO compensation, indicating the importance of CEO tenure in negotiating his/her 
compensation package.   
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ceop 0.387 0.136 0.000 0.820 
Board_size 8.960 2.331 4.000 17.000 
Board_Independence 0.642 0.124 0.380 1.000 
Board_meetings 9.400 3.306 4.000 27.000 
CEO_tenure 4.568 4.585 0.000 21.600 
CEO_age 51.624 6.886 32.000 64.000 
Leverage 0.041 0.072 0.000 0.860 
Size 6.170 0.671 4.020 7.500 
ROE 0.256 0.338 -0.960 0.999 
CEOpay is CEO pay slice defined as the percentage of the total cash compensation of top 
executives captured by the CEO; Board-size is the number of directors on board; Board-
Independence is the ratio of non-executive directors to total number of directors on board; 
Board-meetings measured as number of board meetings per year,; CEO tenure is the number 
of years for the CEO in his position; CEO age is the age of the CEO;; Leverage is ratio of 
total debt to total equity; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets;  ROE is net income to 
total equity. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
 
Board_size Board_Independence Board_meetings CEO_tenure CEO_age leverage size  ROE 
Board_size 1.000 
       
Board_Independence 0.153*** 1.000 
      
Board_meetings -0.142* -0.029 1.000 
     
CEO_tenure 0.078 -0.077 -0.163** 1.000 
    
CEO_age 0.195*** 0.263*** 0.041*** 0.310 1.000 
   
leverage 0.154* 0.026 0.008 -0.115 0.102 1.000 
  
size  0.525** 0.080** 0.001* 0.306 0.419* 0.099 1.000 
 
ROE 0.149* 0.060 0.019 0.116 -0.041 -0.053 0.128 1.000 
Note: Variables are defined in Table 1, ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3 Determinants of CEO compensation –Fixed effects models 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Board_size -0.023*** 0.007 -0.023*** 0.007 -0.020*** 0.006 -0.020*** 0.007 
Board_Independence 0.446*** 0.096 0.384*** 0.114 0.412*** 0.100 0.371*** 0.118 
Board_meetings -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.004 
CEO_tenure 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 
CEO_age -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
leverage 
    
-0.087 0.083 -0.082 0.088 
size  
    
0.085* 0.049 0.063 0.053 
profitability  
    
0.0001*** 0.000 0.0001*** 0.000 
constant 0.360** 0.152 0.376** 0.164 -0.153 0.325 -0.008 0.371 
Years No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 R2 0.207 
 
0.300 
 
0.260 
 
0.29 
 Note: Variables are defined in Table 1; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
Table 4 Determinants of CEO compensation –Clustered errors models 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Board_size -0.026*** 0.002 -0.026*** 0.002 -0.027*** 0.003 -0.027*** 0.003 
Board_Independence 0.469*** 0.104 0.457*** 0.119 0.481*** 0.119 0.459*** 0.148 
Board_meetings 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
CEO_tenure -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
CEO_age 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Leverage 
    
0.026 0.188 0.031 0.205 
size  
    
0.011 0.016 0.012 0.017 
profitability  
   
-0.024 0.025 -0.025 0.031 
Constant 0.208*** 0.060 0.240*** 0.064 0.183** 0.090 0.207** 0.121 
Years                   No 
 
              Yes 
 
      No 
 
      Yes 
 
R2 0.330 
 
0.350 
 
0.330 
 
0.360 
 Note: Variables are defined in Table 1; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; standard errors are robust to serial 
correlation within each group and time.  
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Table 5 Further analysis  
 
Note: Variables are defined in Table 1; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Board_size -0.022*** 0.007 -0.022*** 0.007 -0.018*** 0.007 -0.018*** 0.006 
Board_independence 0.461*** 0.096 0.355*** 0.113 0.367*** 0.118 0.435*** 0.100 
Board_meetings -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
CEO_tenure 0.014** 0.006 0.019*** 0.007 0.014** 0.007 0.009 0.006 
CEO_tenure2 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
CEO_age -0.002 0.025 -0.019 0.026 0.008 0.028 0.020 0.026 
CEO_age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 
    
-0.071 0.090 -0.084 0.084 
size  
    
0.049 0.053 0.080* 0.048 
profitability  
    
0.0001* 0.000 0.0001*** 0.000 
Constant 0.348 0.643 0.829 0.682 -0.188 0.794 -0.693 0.713 
Years No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 R2 0.220 
 
0.270 
 
0.320 
 
0.280 
 
